Combining two databases with unique strengths -one on rankings of voluntary disclosure and the other on ownership -I show that stray firms, i.e. those lacking a controlling owner, have lower disclosure (6-11%). This finding suggests that managers take advantage of low levels of monitoring. Disclosure increases with block ownership, consistent with the idea that large shareholders monitor managers. Importantly, under-diversified owners are associated with higher levels of disclosure, reflecting their stronger incentives to monitor. At high levels of block ownership, however, the largest owners become entrenched, which lowers disclosure. An entrenchment effect is also found for business spheres, which often coincide with controlling minority owners. Institutions and foreign owners largely fail to provide effective monitoring. This study concludes that ownership structure has major implications for voluntary disclosure.
Introduction
A striking feature about corporate disclosure is its large cross-sectional variation. Thanks to a ranking of the voluntary disclosure in the financial reports of Swedish listed firms, carried out annually since 2007, we can get a rare glance into this phenomenon. In this ranking, several features of which makes it ideal for academic inquiry, the obtained scores range from a 100% of the maximum (SAS in 2011) to a mere 26% (MTG, same year), and even lower in some years. This variation is puzzling in light of the supposed benefits of voluntary disclosure.
According to some researchers, e.g. Botosan (1997) , voluntary disclosure reduces information asymmetries, creates transparency, and thereby lowers the cost of capital. The criteria in the Swedish ranking, which are selected based on their usefulness to financial analysts and minority investors, are publicly available. So why do not all firms drift towards a very high score in the disclosure rankings?
While the explanations of the disclosure-puzzle are multi-faceted, in this research I will examine a specific set of determinants, namely the firm's ownership structure. The focus on ownership structure is motivated by the observation that lack of disclosure makes monitoring of corporate insiders more difficult, thus increasing overall agency costs. In fact, for this reason, Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) have described the disclosure agency problem as "the fundamental agency problem underlying other agency problems". They cite anecdotal evidence suggesting that managers, left to their own devices, have a tendency to withhold information from capital market participants. Connecting the disclosure agency problem with the sort of agency costs academics have traditionally studied, Hope and Thomas (2008) show that firms that choose to disclose less are associated with "empire building", i.e. expansion of firm size at the expense of profitability.
The corporate finance literature suggests that large shareholders, given their economic incentives, have an important role in reducing agency costs that arise from the separation of ownership and control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) . Individually, small shareholders have too little at stake to motivate bearing the costs that associated with monitoring managers. On this argument we would expect block ownership to increase voluntary disclosure. However, at high levels of block ownership another well-recognized conflict of interest sets in, namely that between minority and controlling shareholders. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997) costs of concentrated ownership include the possibility that large owners may use their control of the firm to redistribute wealth in various ways to themselves at the expense of minority owners. This concern seems to apply well to voluntary disclosure: as the majority owners become entrenched, and presumably have privileged access to information, they may have less interest in devoting resources to a high-disclosure policy. If you can get the manager on the phone at short notice, why put money and efforts into boosting the firm's public disclosure? Withholding public disclosure about the firm is thus one manifestation of such conflicts of interest between these two different sets of owners.
In this research I show that these two related concerns about voluntary disclosure -the effect of dispersed ownership and entrenched block owners, respectively -are warranted. I address these questions with an ideal data set. Two data bases with unique strengths are merged. For voluntary disclosure I rely on disclosure rankings of the financial reports of Swedish listed firms between 2007 and 2012, hereafter the KA-scores (Jankensgård, 2014a; Jankensgård, 2014b) .
1 The KA-scores offer a rare chance to explore corporate disclosure with recent timeseries data for three important disclosure types: annual and quarterly reports, and web-based reporting. They fit our purposes well: the rankings target voluntary disclosure; take the 1 KA refers to "Kanton" and "Aktiespararna", the two organizations that jointly operate the disclosure rankings.
perspective of financial analysts and minority owners; are based on actual disclosure items (as opposed to perceived disclosure quality); and have a methodology that is largely consistent over time. For ownership data I rely on SIS Ägarservice, who collects detailed ownership data on publicly listed firms in Sweden. This database provides the actual ownership lists of these firms, allowing us to characterize firms' ownership in terms of ownership type, their nationality, cash flow rights, voting rights, association with a business sphere, and so on. As will be further explained in section 3 of this paper, several features of this database are unique. For example, we are able to construct a measure of degree to which the largest owner is over-or underexposed to the focal firm. This measure is closely related to the portfolio concentration measure used in Maury and Ekholm (2014) .
I first document that firms lacking a controlling owner, i.e. one with 10% or more of voting rights, is associated with lower disclosure. The magnitude of the effect is economically large.
For disclosure in annual reports such stray firms have on average 7% lower disclosure, holding size, profitability and other determinants of disclosure constant. For disclosure in quarterly reports the effect is even larger, 11%. These findings paint a clear and worrying picture: managers indeed appear to take advantage of the lack of monitoring implied by dispersed ownership.
A natural follow-up question is whether concentrated ownership and certain ownership types help mitigate the disclosure agency problem. I pursue this question by adding measures of foreign and institutional ownership to the empirical model, as well as dummy variables indicating if the main owner is a private investor or business sphere. The two latter variables signal a low degree of diversification compared to portfolio investors, and hence a higher incentive to monitor. As a complementary, and more explicit, measure of the degree of diversification on part of the largest owner I add the portfolio concentration measure mentioned earlier.
The results suggest that blockholding indeed has a positive effect on the level of disclosure, but it is only weakly significant (p-value=0.09). The weakness of the blockholder-variable turns out to have a simple explanation: the relationship appears to be better described by a quadratic function. Including a squared term for blockholding yields a better model. The quadratic term is negative and highly significant, which is consistent with the entrenchment effect outlined above: while beneficial at first, at a certain point blockholders appear to lose interest in disciplining managers into providing higher disclosure. While this entrenchment effect caps the positive effect on disclosure from having a blockholder, there is still ample room for the benefits to accrue. Inserting values into the model indicates that entrenchment sets in at block ownership of around 50%, suggesting that there is ample room for the beneficial effect of block ownership to play out. I hasten to add, however, that in the Swedish corporate ownership model 50% is by no means an outlier (the median block ownership is 40%).
The portfolio concentration measure delivers a more unambiguous result. This variable is positive and significant (at the 1%-level) in the majority of regressions. Since the concentration measure is higher the larger the investor's exposure to the firm, we can interpret it to suggest that, for any given level of block ownership, the investor's incentives to monitor increases the larger his or her exposure to the firm. That is, under-diversified investors monitor more intensively. Business spheres, on the other hand, are negatively associated with disclosure. Either the result is indicative of an entrenchment effect, or it suggests that the assumption of business spheres having a relatively low degree of diversification is incorrect.
Neither institutional nor foreign ownership provide any apparent monitoring as judging by their insignificance in explaining disclosure levels.
This paper presents several findings that are novel in the literature on voluntary disclosure. To my knowledge it is the first paper to show the entrenchment effect of block ownership in the context of voluntary disclosure, as well as to show that under-diversified owners monitor more intensively. It relates primarily to the work of Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) .
These authors look at a different remedy for the disclosure agency problem, namely providing managers with stock-based incentives. They find empirical support for the idea that highly incentivized managers will disclose more information, but do not analyze ownership structure. Another related paper is Eng (2003) , who analyzes the impact of various corporate governance arrangements on voluntary disclosure, but find no discernible relation between blockholding and disclosure in their sample of Singaporean firms. Chau and Gray (2002) report evidence of an entrenchment effect in that Hong Kong-based firms with large inside ownership (directors and families) are associated with lower disclosure.
The findings in this paper are also important to the literature on corporate governance more generally. Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) argue that research on the impact on the effect of large shareholdings on corporate policies has yielded mixed results, and that this can be partly attributed to blockholder heterogeneity. An alternative explanation to the mixed findings in the literature revolves around the fact that large shareholders simultaneously may improve monitoring of the agents, but become entrenched themselves at high levels of ownership (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988) . For example, Thomsen, Pedersen, and Qvist (2005) show that in Continental Europe large ownership stakes are detrimental to firm value, which they attribute to conflicts of interest between minority and controlling investors. The findings presented in this paper are consistent with this interpretation, and may represent particularly "clean" evidence of such entrenchment effects. To appreciate this, consider that voluntary disclosure is a policy that is set "on top" of everything else. To a fair degree the disclosure policy can be changed easily, on short notice, and at relatively low cost, which sets it apart from policies that are more related to fundamentals (e.g. capital expenditure), or are relatively sticky (e.g. dividends). That is, voluntary disclosure is a variable that can be studied on a largely "equal opportunity"-basis, and therefore makes excellent testing ground for hypotheses related to the ownership of the firm.
Summary of empirical predictions
While the main hypotheses to be investigated in this paper are outlined in the introduction, this section contains a brief summary of them.
The first hypothesis (H1) is that firms with dispersed ownership ('stray firms') have lower levels of voluntary disclosure. This prediction is based on the disclosure agency-problem in Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) , according to which managers have an inherent preference for low disclosure, so as to maximize their discretion over corporate policies.
The second hypothesis (H2), and highly related to the first, is that voluntary disclosure increases with block ownership. This argument builds on the analysis in Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , according to which large ownership presents economic incentives to monitor that owners with smaller stakes do not have.
The third hypothesis (H3) is that the portfolio concentration of the largest shareholders, i.e.
her relative exposure to the focal firm, increase incentives to monitor and therefore voluntary disclosure. Maury and Ekholm (2014) point out that, given resource constraints, an investor will consider the relative importance of the holding when deciding how much to invest in information-collection about the firm. The same argument easily transfers over to any investment in monitoring. On this argument we would predict that private investors (i.e.
individuals and groups of individuals) and business spheres to be associated with higher levels of monitoring and disclosure. Conversely, since institutional investors tend to hold diversified portfolios we would expect them to be associated with lower levels of disclosure.
The empirical predictions with regard to ownership type are not clear cut, however: one could, for example, also make the case that institutional investors represent a form of professional corporate governance, which would suggest a positive influence on disclosure.
Indeed, Liu (2010) report that institutional investors appear to constrain earnings management.
The fourth hypothesis (H4) is that an entrenchment effect sets in at high levels of block ownership. The costs of concentrated ownership are described in Shleifer and Vishny (1997) .
In the case of voluntary disclosure, the conflict of interest revolves around what costs the firm should be prepared to incur related to voluntary disclosure (the costs of voluntary disclosure are summarized in Jankensgård, 2014a) . A large owner with ready access to top management may make a very different cost-benefit assessment than minority owners, who are more reliant on public information. Note also that the argument in H1 applies here as well: large owners intent on diverting the firm's resources for their own benefit will prefer lower disclosure and insight into the company's affairs.
Sample, variables, and descriptive statistics

Sample
The sample used in this study is the intersection of three databases: SIS Ägarservice (ownership data), the Kanton/Aktiespararna yearly rankings (disclosure data), and Datastream (financial data). The sample covers the period between 2007 and 2012. Merging these databases yields around 850 firm year observations after excluding financial firms and investment companies. The industry composition is as follows: basic materials 6%; industrials 37%; consumer goods 11%; health care 13%; consumer services 13%; telecommunications 2%; technology 16%; and oil & gas 3%. There are no utility firms in the sample. In the following two sections the disclosure data and ownership data are described more in detail.
Disclosure data
The disclosure data is based on rankings of disclosure by Swedish listed firms. This ranking is carried out by Kanton, a Swedish financial advisory firm, and Aktiespararna, an association representing the best interest of minority shareholders in Sweden. The KA-rankings comprise firms listed on Nasdaq OMX and the NGM Equity-list (NGM). NGM is a trading platform for small firms that seek risk capital. The ranking has been carried out every year between 2007 and 2012. 2 The KA-scores cover the large majority of Swedish listed firms in any given year.
The criteria for being included, apart from being listed on one of the two aforementioned exchanges, are that a firm is headquartered in Sweden and publishes its financial reports in
Swedish. There are three separate rankings: annual reports, quarterly reports, and web-based information. Firms are communicated the preliminary scores they obtain, and are encouraged to review them before the final score is assigned. The criteria for each of the three categories are selected based on their perceived usefulness to financial analysts and minority investors.
The criteria are generic in that they apply to any firm and are not industry-specific. They target voluntary disclosure: when a disclosure item becomes mandatory according to IFRS, it is subsequently removed. The criteria used are broadly consistent over time, except for a major revision in 2010. In this revision several of the easiest disclosure items were replaced by more meaningful ones. Since the new criteria were harder to meet, the net effect was a drop in the average value for all three rankings in 2010.
Ownership data
The ownership data used in this study is collected by SIS Ägarservice, a Stockholm-based firm specializing in providing and analyzing ownership information. They provide complete ownership lists for listed firms in Sweden, except for ownership stakes smaller than 0.1%. these spheres is that they use a complex web of controlling stakes and cross-holdings to achieve effective control, though cash flow rights are typically much smaller (see Collin, 1998) .
Variables
Disclosure variables
I define three disclosure scores: DISCY, DISCQ, and DISCW. DISCY is the score the firm obtains for its disclosure in annual report. DISCQ and DISCW are the corresponding scores for disclosure in quarterly reports and on the web, respectively. In 2011, the 19 criteria for quarterly reports were: 1) important events during the quarter (1 item), 2) statement from the CEO (3 items), 3) financial ratios (3 items). 4) performance overview at least eight quarters back (3 items), 5) seasonal effects (1 item), 6) market developments (1 item), 7) brief description of the firm (4 items), 8) other (3 items). In the same year, the 35 criteria for web-based reporting were as follows: 1) basic functions, e.g. search (2 items), 2) non-financial information, e.g. organization map (14 items), 3) financial information in excel-format (4 items), 4) web broadcasts (1 item), 5) calendar of events (2 item), 6) risk analysis (5 items), 7) contact information (2 items), 8)
information about the share and ownership (3 items), 9) dictionary (2 items). The complete set of definitions, criteria, and rankings for all years are available from the author on request.
Ownership variables
Consistent with the definition in Leaven and Lavine (2008) Three variables are introduced to capture the ability of the smaller shareholders to monitor the largest investor. ALONE measures the difference between the cash flow rights of the two largest shareholders. The intuition is that a large difference indicates a lower ability of the second largest owner to monitor the largest one (conversely, a lower one would be indicative of the incentives to collude). NRSHAREHOLDERS is the number of shareholders that appear on the SIS Ägarservice ownership list, which corresponds to all those having a stake larger than 0.1%. This variable captures the breadth of the firm's ownership base. A large number of comparatively incentivised small shareholders may serve to bring pressure on management and the majority owners to increase disclosure levels. TOPFLOAT40 is the sum of the 4 th -40 th largest shareholders and thus represent the largest owners in the firm's free float. Again, relatively incentivised owners below the top-3 blockholders can serve to mitigate conflicts of interests between minority and majority owners.
Control variables
The control variables used in this study are as follows. SIZE is defined as the log of total assets (WC02999). LEVERAGE is defined as total debt divided by total assets Table 2 reports the mean, median, maximum, minimum and standard deviation of the variables used in the study. Note that the disclosure-scores are not directly comparable since the maximum obtainable value is different for the three disclosure types. We observe in Table   2 that block ownership is indeed the norm in Sweden. The median for this variable is 40%, which is a high number in comparison with the US and UK, but somewhat below those of Continental Europe (Thomsen et al, 2006) . Table 3 provides the pearson correlations between the variables analyzed in this study. [INSERT 
where d t is period fixed effects, α j is industry fixed effects, and v j,t is an error term. 
Multivariate analysis
Dispersed ownership and disclosure
In this section we include only one ownership variable, STRAY. The purpose is to answer a simple question: do firms without a controlling owner disclose less information? The background for this question is of course the first hypothesis outlined in Section 2, namely that managers take advantage of low levels of monitoring and disclosure less. Table 5 contains the result from two regressions. Model 1 uses DISCY, which normalizes the disclosure score with the maximum obtainable in any given year, as dependent. Model 2 instead replaces DISCY with the log of the original disclosure score. The disclosure score does not exhibit a log-normal distribution: in fact, is meets the normality assumption rather well. The reason for this specification is instead to allow an interpretation of STRAY in percentage terms.
[ INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] Table 5 shows that disclosure is negatively related to the lack of a controlling owner. Model 2
indicates that the average effect is around 6.5%. As a robustness (untabulated) I replace STRAY with a dummy for which the 10%-threshold is based on cash flow rather than voting rights. The main change is that the statistical significance improves (p-value drops from 0.07 to 0.02). Taken together, these findings provide clear support the disclosure agency-hypothesis of Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) . Managers of firms without controlling owners do seem to take advantage of this fact by lowering the level of disclosure. This result could be interpreted as saying that, all else equal, managers prefer less disclosure to more.
Is disclosure affected by incentives to monitor?
In the previous section we found evidence suggesting that managers, when there is no controlling owner, reduce the flow of information available to the public. A natural follow-up question is whether disclosure increases in the incentives of large shareholders to monitor. This is certainly implied by the coefficient on STRAY, but in this section we refine the analysis in various ways. We introduce several variables that capture incentives to monitor into the empirical model so at to test Hypotheses 2 and 3. The results are reported in Model 1 in Table 6 . In Model 2 we add the most explicit measure of the degree to which the main owner has an under-diversified portfolio, WEIGHT.
[ INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] Table 6 supports the hypothesis that block ownership leads to more monitoring, although BLOCKHOLDING is only weakly significant (p-value 0.095). When WEIGHT is added to the model, it is no longer significant on conventional levels, however. We find no indication that private, institutional, or foreign owners affect disclosure levels. SPHERE, however, is significant at the 5%-level, though the sign is contrary to hypothesis 3. The negative sign is indicative of an entrenchment effect, which appears to dominate any positive effect from higher levels of monitoring. An entrenchment effect is not implausible. Business spheres in Sweden are known to have voting rights well in excess of their cash flow rights. 4 Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) show that firms with controlling minority owners are afflicted by severe agency costs. For example, such firms have lower Tobin's Q, are less profitable, and are less likely to be acquired. Having lower voluntary disclosure is consistent with their findings.
The most unambiguous support for hypothesis 2, i.e. that under-diversification increases incentives to monitor, comes from the result on WEIGHT (Model 2). The coefficient is significant, and as I will show later, robust to changes in the model specification. The coefficient reported in Table 2 is very low, however, leading to concerns about the economic importance of this variable. However, this is related to a large fraction of zeroes for this variable (meaning that the largest owner is neither over-or underexposed to the firm). To assess the economic effect in a more meaningful way I define a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm-year observation belongs to the 4 th quartile of WEIGHT (corresponding to values of WEIGHT of around 0.7 or higher, meaning a substantial concentration of exposure on part of the largest owner. In an untabulated analysis I then regress the log of the original DISCY variable on this dummy (keeping the other controls). The results indicate that firms belonging to the highest quartile in terms of under-diversified owners have on average about 6% higher disclosure, other things equal. The question, of course, is whether all things really are equal. It cannot be ruled out that owners who concentrate their holdings do so in firms that are well managed to begin with, and that these firms have higher disclosure. We will come back to endogeneity issues in section 4.4.
Is the relationship between block ownership and disclosure non-linear?
In Section 4.2 we documented a positive relationship between block ownership and disclosure, albeit a weak one. In this section we turn our attention to a possible explanation for this weakness, which also involves testing hypothesis 4. As discussed previously, having large owners implies more intense monitoring of managers, but also carries with it the potential for another type of conflict of interest, which is that between minority and controlling investors. If such conflicts are at hand, we would expect the benefits of block ownership to taper off at high levels. I go about testing for such entrenchment effects in a straightforward way by including the squared term of BLOCKHOLDER in the model. The results are reported in Table 7 (Model 1). Table 7 also contains the results from a regression that includes various proxies for the ability of non-controlling shareholders to put pressure on the largest owners (Model 2).
[
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
According to Table 7 the quadratic model indeed is a better fit for describing the relationship between block ownership and disclosure. This is consistent with an entrenchment effect setting in at high levels of block ownership, and explains why BLOCKHOLDER on its own has a rather weak impact on disclosure. Inserting possible values for BLOCKHOLDER into the model renders an optimal level of block ownership of about 50%. While this would seem to leave ample room for block ownership to exercise a beneficial influence, it should be kept in mind that the sample median for BLOCKHOLDER is 40%.
Of the indicators for monitoring intensity on part of the non-controlling owners only NRSHAREHOLDERS come out significant. While NRSHAREHOLDERS has a positive effect on disclosure, the inclusion of this variable and the other proxies for monitoring by the non-controlling shareholders does not affect the relationship between BLOCKHOLDER and DISCY to any significant degree. Recall that NRSHAREHOLDERS is not the total number of shareholders, but rather the number of shareholders with a stake larger than 0.1%. It seems that having many shareholders with a relatively large stake is conducive to more higher disclosure. 
Endogeneity
As in most cross-sectional analysis in the social sciences, this study faces the issue of endogeneity. More specifically, we are talking about self-selection of block owners into firms whose disclosure policy suits their preferences. While this issue should be taken seriously, one particular feature of disclosure policy should be noted: the ease with which it can be changed on relatively short notice and at relatively low cost. Voluntary disclosure is, to a higher degree than many other corporate policies, set "on top" of everything else: management may simply decide whether to disclose or withhold a certain piece of 5 The portion of the firm's free float consisting of owners with stakes smaller than 0.1%, i.e. its "micro float" has a median of around 25% in our sample. Including this variable in the model leads to problem of multicollinearity, but in untabulated regressions excluding the other ownership variables, it is not significantly related to disclosure.
information. This suggests that a blockholder need not direct his or her investments in to a particular firm solely to obtain a high-disclosure policy.
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The endogeneity-issue becomes complicated by the fact that we have documented a nonlinear relation between block ownership and disclosure. This makes a strategy involving looking at whether past changes in block ownership predict future changes in disclosure difficult to interpret. The strategy for mitigating endogeneity concerns is instead to lag the dependent variables one and two years. By so doing one eliminates the influence of owners that self-select into the firm in the years immediately prior to measurement. The results from these regressions are reported in Table 8 . This analysis suggests that, controlling for endogeneity, the results are even stronger for BLOCKHOLDING. The results with regard to SPHERE and WEIGHT continue to hold.
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
Disclosure in quarterly reports
So far in this paper the focus has been on the disclosure in annual reports. This is consistent with previous research stating that annual reports are the most important disclosure document for analysts, with other forms of reports largely acting as supplements to it (Knutson, 1992; Botosan, 1997) . In this section we extend the analysis to investigate disclosure in quarterly reports, another important disclosure type. Quarterly reports make certain value-relevant information available on a more timely basis than annual reports (Botosan and Harris, 2000) .
First we are interested to see if the disclosure agency-hypothesis of Nagar, Nanda, and
Wysocki (2003) also finds support when DISCQ rather than DISCY is the dependent variable. Table 9 reports this result (Model 1). Next we re-run the full specification of Equation 1
(Model 2 in Table 9 corresponds to Model 2 in Table 7 ). Please note that Model 1 uses the log of the original (undeflated) disclosure-score. Again, this is done in order to gauge the economic magnitude of the impact. The results in Table 9 confirm that stray firms are prone to disclose less information. At 11% the effect is even larger than in annual reports.
Generally, though, the ownership-variables do a poorer job of explaining variation in disclosure levels. NRSHAREHOLDERS again is significant (at the 5%-level) with a positive sign. Interestingly, this variable is the only determinant to be significant in explaining all three disclosure measures. Also for web-based disclosure this variable indicates a positive relationship (the other two variables that are significant in this regression are SIZE and WEIGHT, both with a positive relation. The full results are excluded to preserve space but available on request). This suggests that the number of shareholders with a stake exceeding 0.1% captures something in the firm's environment that is conducive to higher disclosure.
7
Perhaps this finding represents a cost-benefit calculus by managers: that catering to a large number of shareholders (with relatively small stakes individually) makes sense if they to a higher degree base their investment decision on the available public information and that is perceived to lower the cost of capital. Such a pattern of behavior could create a link between voluntary disclosure the number of shareholders.
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE]
Conclusions
An inevitable conclusion from the empirical analysis presented in this paper is that ownership structure has major implications for voluntary disclosure. Two of the main concerns voiced in the corporate governance literature have found support in the data: stray firms, i.e. those lacking a controlling owner, disclose less information, and at high levels of block ownership an entrenchment effect sets in. The first result suggests that managers of firms with dispersed ownership take advantage of this fact by disclosing less, which in turn increases the potential for other agency costs. The second result suggests that block owners above a certain size lose their economic incentives to monitor management, presumably because they have easy access to top management already. We have also found an entrenchment for business spheres, which are associated with controlling minority stakes, whereas institutional and foreign investors are unrelated to voluntary disclosure. The number of shareholders robustly predicts disclosure levels for all three measures of disclosure analyzed in this paper.
Based on the above set of findings, we can characterize a 'good discloser' in the following way. It is a relatively large firm that has a controlling owner, but block ownership is not very high (in this sample, does not exceed 50%). The largest owner is heavily exposed to the firm in terms of portfolio concentration, but does not belong to a business sphere. The firm has a large number of shareholders with stakes larger than 1%. Note that a 'good discloser' should not be taken to mean that high levels of disclosure are necessarily beneficial to the firm, or that the factors that increase disclosure also increase firm value. However, it is quite reasonable to assume that the impact of voluntary disclosure on the cost of capital (and hence firm value) is mediated through its ownership structure. Exploring this connection is an exciting venue for future research.
APPENDIX Table 1 Variables
This table summarizes the variables used in this paper, their computation and the data sources from which they are obtained. WEIGHT is a measure of the largest owner's portfolio concentration, and is higher the larger this owners exposure to the focal firm. ALONE is the difference between the largest and second largest owners. NRSHAREHOLDERS is the number of shareholders with an ownership above 0.1%. TOPFLOAT40 is the sum of the ownership stake of the 4-40 th largerst owners. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Description
Model 1
Model 2 WEIGHT is a measure of the largest owner's portfolio concentration, and is higher the larger this owners exposure to the focal firm. ALONE is the difference between the largest and second largest owners. NRSHAREHOLDERS is the number of shareholders with an ownership above 0.1%. TOPFLOAT40 is the sum of the ownership stake of the 4-40 th largerst owners. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Model 2 
